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the judgment based upon that order was pending. There 
was, therefore, as I read the record, no exercise of discre-
tion but the denial of the right to take testimony until "the 
determination of said appeal". The fact that this was said 
to be "for the convenience of the parties and in the interests 
of justice" does not change the situation because the defend-
ant relied entirely upon the fact that the appeal was pending 
as the ground for her demand for a postponement. Under 
these circumstances the case falls squarely within the rule 
stated in San Francisco Gas &- Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 
155 Cal. 30 [99 Pac. 359, 17 Ann. Cas. 933], and the per-
emptory writ of mandate should issue. 
[So F. No. 164'35. In Bank.-October 2, 1940.] 
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Petitioner, V. GEORGE A. JANS-
SEN, as Chairman of Board of Supervisors, etc., Re-
spondent. ~ 
[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC MONEY-GIFTS-OLD AGE SECURITY. 
Section 31 of article IV of the California Constitution prohibits 
the legislature from making or authorizing a gift of public money 
or thing of value to any individual or corporation, but does not 
prevent the legislature from granting aid to indigent aged pursuant 
to section 22 of said article. 
[2] ID.-WELFARE CODE--RELEASE OF LIENs.-Release of a lien by a 
county pursuant to section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code does not constitute a violation of section 31 of article IV of 
the Constitution. 
[3] ID.-GIFTS-PuBLIC PURPosEs-TEST.-In determining whether an 
appropriation of public funds or property is to be considered a 
gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for 
the "public" or a "private" purpose; and if they are for a "public 
purpose" they are not a gift within the meaning of section 31 of 
article IV of the Constitution. 
[4] ID. - LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION.-The determination of what con-
stitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legislative dis-
cretion, which is not disturbed by the courts so long as it has a 
reasonable basis. 
3. See 23 Cal. Jur. 563. 
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[5] ID.-AID TO INDIGENTS-RELEASE OF LIENs.-An increase in the 
benefits to indigent recIpients of aid after the right to them has 
vested is not a gift within the meaning of article IV, section 31, of 
the Constitution; and the release of a lien which facilitates the sale 
of property or loans thereon serves the same public purpose of 
aiding the indigent aged as a direct grant of money and is justified. 
[6] ID.-GRANT OF AID--RELEASE OF LIENs.-Once the board of su-
pervisors has determined, after investigation as required by sec-
tion 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, that the purpose 
of the Old Age Security Act is served by the release of a lien upon 
the property of a recipient of aid, such a release becomes a grant 
of aid pursuant to section 22 of article IV of the Constitution for 
the support of indigent aged, and is, therefore, within the excep-
tion in section 31 of said article. 
[7] ID.-AID WITHOUT LIEN-POWER OF LEGISLATURE.-The legislature 
has the power to grant aid to indigent aged without imposing any 
lien upon their property, and whenever it does so it supplements 
direct aid with the benefits which attend freedom from such an en-
cumbrance. 
[8] ID.-PROPERTY AGREEMENTS-CANCELLATION of.-Since the legisla-
ture may extend aid to indigent aged by authorizing the release of 
liens previously acquired upon their property, it may for the same 
reasons cancel Old Age Security Property Agreements by which 
recipients of aid agreed not to transfer their real property without 
consent of local boards of supervisors, which does not violate the 
United Stutes or California Constitutions as impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts. 
[9] ID.-CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS-POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-Provisions of 
the United States and California Constitutions prohibiting the 
passage of any law impairing the obligations of contracts do not 
prevent the legislature from changing the contractual rights of its 
political subdivisions acting in a governmental capacity. 
[10] ID_-WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE--DELEGATION OF LEGISLA-
TIVE AUTHORITY.-Section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
(Stats. 1939, chap. 719) is not an unlawful delegation of legislative 
authority to the boards of supervisors, for that section was passed 
to serve the purpose of the Old Age Security Act which provides 
adequate standards for regulating the authority of the boards of 
supervisors to grant old age security. 
[11] In.-SPECIAL LAWS-CLASSIFICATION.-Section 2227 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code does not violate section 25 of article IV of 
the state Constitution prohibiting the legislature from passing any 
local or special law authorizing the creation, extension or impair-
ment of liens, for the classification of the indigent aged as a 
group based upon a clear distinction between them and other in-
dividuals in the state and applies equally to all persons embraced 
in this class. 
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. [12] ID.-RELEASE OF LIEN-PAYMENT TO COUNTy-PRESUMPTIONS.-
There can be no constitutional objection to a county's release of 
sueh liens upon payment to the county of such amounts as in the 
opinion of the board of supervisors equal the net amounts which 
would be released in the event the liens were foreclosed, since the 
county would receive the fair value of the liens as consideration for 
their release, and it must be presumed the board would not abuse 
its power. 
PROCEEDING in Mandamus to compel the Chairman of 
the Board of Supervisors of Alamada County to release liens 
and cancel Old Age Security Property Agreements. Writ 
granted. 
Ralph E. Hoyt, District Attorney of Alameda County, J. F. 
Coakley, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Robert H. Mc-
Creary, Assistant District Attorney, Lawrence S. Fletcher, 
Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner. 
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and L. K. 
Vobayda. and Gerald G. Kelly, Deputy County COUll1lel, as 
Amici Curiae, on Behalf of Petitioner. 
Landels, Weigel & Crocker for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By this proceeding in mandamus the peti-
tioner seeks to compel the respondent, as chairman of the 
Board of Supervisors of the County of Alameda, to sign 
and execute certain releases of liens and to cancel a restric-
tive agreement with respect to the real properties of the 
recipients of financial aid granted under the provisions of 
the Old Age Security Act. Respondent has generally de-
murred. 
In 1929 the legislature enacted the Old Age Security Act 
(Stats. 1929, chap. 530, p. 914) which provided for financial 
assistance to the needy aged who met certain requirements 
and whose property did not exceed specified values. In 1935 
section 4 of the act was amended (Stats. 1935, p. 1769) to 
provide for a lien against the real property of a recipient as 
security for the aid which he received. In 1937 the legisla-
ture amended sections 2224 and 2225 of the WeHare and In-
stitutions Code, into which section 4 of the Old Age Security 
Act had been incorporated, to eliminate the provisions for 
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such liens as well as the provisions making the aid a debt of 
the recipient to the state and county . 
At the same time section 2225 was amended to provide that 
"all liens and mortgages heretofore created under the provi-
sions of this chapter are. hereby released and the board of 
supervisors of each county is hereby directed and authorized 
to execute and record appropriate instruments of release". 
In County of Los Angeles v. Jessup, 11 Cal. (2d) 273 [78 
Pac. (2d) 1131], this provision was held unconstitutional as 
authorizing a gift of "public money or thing of value" in 
violation of section 31 of article IV of the Constitution. 
Thereupon the legislature in 1939 adopted section 2227 of 
the Welfare and Institutions Code (Stats. 1939, chap. 719), 
which provides in part: "Any lien created by the recording 
of a notice of aid pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 530 
of the Statutes of 1929 as amended by Statutes of 1935, page 
1769, may be released by the board of supervisors of the 
county granting the aid upon payment to the county of the 
amount of aid repayment of which is thereby secured or upon 
payment to the county of such amount as in the opinion of 
the board of supervisors equals the net amount which would 
be realized in· the event that said lien was foreclosed, and 
any such lien may be subordinated by the board of super-
visors of the county granting the aid to the lien of any mort-
gage or deed of trust given to renew or refinance any mort-
gage, deed of trust or other encumbrance, the lien or charge 
of which had priority over such lien. In any case in which 
the board of supervisors determines, after investigation, that 
the purposes of this chapter will be served by releasing any 
such lien. in whole or in part by subordinating the same to 
any encumbrance and determines that the property affected 
by such lien is at the time owned by the recipient of aid the 
board of supervisors may after approval by the Department 
of Social Welfare release such lien in whole or in part or may 
subordinate the same to one or more designated encumbrances 
executed by the recipient of aid without consideration or for 
such consideration as the board shall determine." 
At the same time the legislature added to the code section 
2226 which provided in part as follows: 
"If the recipient of aid under this chapter owns or acquires 
real property or any estate or interest therein the board of 
supervisors may require him to enter into a written agree-
ment that he will not, during his lifetime, without the con-
• 
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sent of the board of supervisors, transfer or encumber such 
property, which agreement shall specifically describe such 
property, be acknowledged by the recipient in the same_man-
ner as a grant of real property and be recorded in the office 
of the county recorder of each county wherein such real prop-
erty or some part thereof lies. " and added section 2229 which 
gave the county not only a claim against the estate of any 
deceased recipient for reimbursement of aid but also" all the 
rights of an unsecured creditor against the entire estate of 
the recipient". (Stats. 1939, chap. 719.) Legislation which 
became effective February 23, 1940 (Stats. 1940, chap. XI, 
sec. 5), repealed the provisions for agreements by recipients 
of aid not to conveyor encUmber their property, all such 
agreements being "hereby cancelled and declared to be here-
after of no force and effect". The boards of supervisors were 
directed to "authorize" by resolution, upon application, the 
execution and recordation of appropriate instruments of can-
cellation of any or all of the agreements canceled by this 
section. 
Pursuant to section 2227, the Board of Supervisors of " 
Alameda County adopted a resolution releasing without con- -l 
sideration a statutory lien previously acquired on certain 
real property of a recipient of aid, which he still owned, when 
it found after investigation that the purposes of the Old 
Age Security Law would be served by giving the release. 
At the same time the board, pursuant to section 5 of chapter 
XI of the "1940 Statutes, adopted a resolution canceling and 
releasing without consideration an agreement not to conveyor 
encumber real property. It likewise adopted a resolution, 
pursuant to section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
releasing its lien against certain real property" of a recipient 
of aid held by a third party upon payment to the county of 
an amount which in the opinion of the board equaled the net 
amount which woUld be realized in the event the lien were 
foreclosed. 
"Respondent Geo. A. Janssen, as chairman of the Board of 
Supervisors of Alameda County, refuses to sign and execute 
the above-described releases and cancellation 'on the grounds 
that section 2227 of" the Welfare and Institutions Code vio-
lates section 31 of article IV" of the California Constitution 
prohibiting the legislature from making or authorizing any 
gift of public money or thing of value to any individual, as 
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well as section 25 of article IV of the Constitution prohibit-
ing the passage of any special or local law authorizing the 
creation, extension or impairment of liens, and constitutes 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. He 
further contends that chapter XI of Statutes of 1940 violates 
the prohibitions in the United States and California Constitu-
tions against the passage of any law impairing the obligation 
of contracts. 
[1] Section 31 of article IV of the California Constitution 
prohibits the legislature from making or authorizing a gift 
of public money or thing of value to any individual or cor-
poration. The next clause, however, provides that nothing in 
this section shall prevent the legislature from granting aid 
pursuant to section 22 of article IV which authorizes the 
granting of aid to indigent aged. [2] Therefore the release 
of a lien by a county pursuant to section 2227 of the WeHare 
Code does not constitute a violation of section 31, article IV: 
if (1) it is not a gift of public money or thing of value, or 
(2) it is a grant of aid to indigent aged under section 22 of 
article IV. 
[3] It is well settled that, in determining whether an ap-
propriation of public funds or property is to be considered 
a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be 
used for a "public" or a "private" purpose. If they are 
for a "public purpose", they are not a gift within the mean-
ing of section 31 of article IV. (Oounty of San Diego v. 
Hammond, 6 Cal. (2d) 709 [59 Pac. (2d) 478] ; Oity of Oak-
land v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 298 [228 Pac. 433] ; Allied Archi-
tects Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [221 Pac. 209, 30 A. L. R. 
1029]; Veterans' Welfare Board v. lUZey, 188 Cal. 607 [206 
Pac. 631].) The benefit to the state from an expenditure for 
a "public purpose" is in the nature of consideration and the 
fWlds expended are therefore not a gift even though private 
persons are benefited therefrom. (Allied Architects Assn. 
v. Payne, supra.) 
[4] The determination of what constitutes a public pur-
pose is primarily a matter for legislative discretion ( Veter-
ans' Welfare Board v. Riley, supra; Allied Architects Assn; 
v. Payne, supra; Daggett v. Oolgan, 92 Cal. 53 [28 Pac. 51, 
27~. St. Rep. 95, 14 L. R. A. 474]), which is not disturbed 
by the courts so long as it has a reasonable basis. (Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U. S. 502 [54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940]; 
\ 
,1 
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Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 [8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257, 
32 L. Ed. 253].) This court has frequently upheld the ex-
penditure of funds by the state or its subdivisions for the 
benefit of individuals as for a "public purpose" and hence 
not within section 31 of article IV. (MacMt'llan v. Clarke, 
184 Cal. 491 [194 Pac. 1030, 17 A. L. R. 288] [free school 
textbooks] ; Veterans' Welfare Board v. Riley, supra [trans-
portation, tuition and living expenses for education of veter-
ans]; Allied Architects Assn. v. Payne, supra [erection of 
memorial hall for war veterans] ; City of Oakland v'. Garrison, 
supra [street improvements] j Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350 
[287 Pac. 455] [payments for destruction of diseased cattle] j 
Sacramento &7 San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Rt'ley, 199 Cal. 
668 [251 Pac. 2071 [flood control] ; City of San Francisco v. 
Collins, 216 Cal. 187 [13 Pac. (2d) 912] [bond issue for re-
lief of indigent sick and poor]; Housing Authority of Los 
Angeles v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. (2d) 437 [94 Pac. (2d) 794] 
[slum clearance] ; City of San Diego v. Hammond, supra [use 
of county funds to pay delinquent assessments on overbur-
dened property]; Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 540 
[54 Pac. (2d) 510], [free treatment in county hospital only ~ 
for those unable to pay]. See 9 Cal. Law Rev. 431; 18 Cal. 
Law Rev. 697.) 
[5] In the present case the legislature seems clearly justi-
fied in its belief that the release of liens held against the 
property of indigent recipients of aid is for the general public 
welfare. A person may be indigent even though he is the 
legal owner of real property and an increase in the benefits 
to indigent recipients of aid after the right to them has vested 
is not a' gift within the meaning of article IV, section 31. 
(Home v. Souden, 199 Cal. 508 [250 Pac. 162]; O'Dea v. 
Cooke, 176 Cal. 659 [169 Pac. 366].) The release of a lien 
which facilitates the sale of property or loans thereon serves 
the same public purpose of aiding the indigent aged as a 
direct grant of money. It may remove the necessity for ad· 
ditional direct aid to the owner. The county could not in 
any event enforce the lien until the death of the recipient and 
might gain less at that time than it would lose in direct aid to 
the recipient during his lifetime. By releasing the lien from 
the recipient's property, the county may relieve the public 
treasury to the extent that it relieves the recipient. 
[6] Once the board of supervisors has determined, after 
investigation as required by section 2227 of the Welfare and 
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Institutions Code, that the purpose of the Old Age Security 
Act is served by the release of a lien upon the property of 
a recipient of aid, such a release becomes a grant of aid pur-
suant to section 22 of article IV for the support of indigent 
aged and therefore within the exception in section 31 of 
article IV. In the absence of a special statute no liability 
rests upon an aged person to reimburse the state and county 
for aid legitimately obtained and granted (Bremer County 
v. Curtis, 54 Iowa 72 [6 N. W. 135] ; Montgomery County v. 
Gupton, 139 Mo. 303 [39 S. W. 447, 40 S. W. 1094] ; Peabody 
v. Town of Holland, 107 Vt. 237 [178 Atl. 888, 98 A. L. R. 
866] ; Chester v. Underhill, 16 N. H. 64; Stow v. Sawyer, 85 
Mass. 515 j In re Dufek's Estate, 164 Minn. 55 [204 N. W. 
469] ; Spokane Co. v. Arvin, 169 Wash. 349 [13 Pac. (2d) 
1089]), and there is no provision in section 22 of article IV 
requiring such liability. [7] The legislature thus has the 
power to grant aid to indigent aged without imposing any 
lien upon their property and whenever it does so it supple-
ments direct aid with the benefits which attend freedom from 
such an encumbrance. If instead it imposes a lien upon the 
property of recipients of aid which, it subsequently releases 
it merely defers the benefits supplementary to direct aid 
which it might have conferred at the outset. In either case 
the benefits serve the same public purpose of aiding the in-
digent aged. 
The legislation in question differs materially from section 
2225 of the WeHare and Institutions Code, held unconstitu-
tional in County of Los Angeles v. Jessup, 11 Cal. (2d) 273 
[78 Pac. (2d) 113]]. (12 So. Cal. Law Rev. 310.) Section 
2225 authorized the release of statutory liens on property 
which had passed from the recipient of aid to an heir or 
grantee and on property of recipients of aid not qualified to 
receive it. As the section purported to apply to all liens, 
and its provisions were not separable, it was held invalid as 
a whole, but the court expre,.sly refrained from passing on the 
question whether "legislation may constitutionally be framed 
looking toward the release of such statutory liens as may exist 
under other classes of typical cases alleged in the petition". 
The legislation in this case authorizes the release of liens only 
if the property is still owned by a qualified recipient of aid 
or, ir- the event it has passed to another, if the county re-
.. 
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ceives an amount equal to the value which may be realized 
upon, foreclosure of the lien. 
[8] Since the legislature may e~tend' aid to hidigent aged 
by autb.o~izing the release of liens previously acquired upon 
iheir property, it may for the same reasons cancel Old, Age 
Security' Property Agreements by which recipients of aid 
a~eed not to transfer their real property without consent of 
loca.l' boards of supervisors. Such cancellations in no way 
violate the provisions of the United States a~d California 
Constitutions prohibiting the passage of any law impairing 
the obligation of contracts. [9] These provisions do not 
prevent the legislature from changing the contractual rights 
of its political subdivisions acting in a governmental capacity. 
(Oounty of Tulare v. Oity of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664 [206 Pac. 
983]; Oityof Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 [43 Sup. 
Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. 937] ; Oity of Worcester V. Worcester Oon-
sol. Street Ra~1wayOo., 196 U. S.539 [25 Sup. Ct. 327, 49 
L. Ed. 591].) As the county boards of supervisors are act-
ing as agents for the state in dispensing old age relief 
(Oounty of Sacramento v. Ohambers,33 Cal. App. 142 [164 
Pac. 613]; San Francisco v. Oollins, 216 Cal. 187 [13 Pac. 
(2d) 912]), there can be no impairment of contracts upon a . 
voluntary relinquishment by the state of any contractual-~ 
rights it may have acquired. The passing statement in Oounty 
otLos Angeles v. Jessup, supra, that the legislation there in 
question was "also constitutionally objectionable because of 
its impairment of the obligation of contract" was unnecessary 
, to the decision of the case, and upon fuller consideration ap-
pears to bewithout support in the authorities. It must, there-
fo~e, be deemed disapproved by our decision herein. 
[10] Respondent's contention that section 2227 is an un-
lawful delegation of legislative authority to the boards of 
supervisors is untenable, for that section was passed to serve 
the purpose of the Old Age Security Act which provides ade-
quate standards for regulating the authority of the boards of 
supervisors to grant old age relief.. An essentially similar 
contention was adversely answered in Hecke v. Riley, 209 Cal. 
767 [290 Pac. 451]. 
[11] Nor does such legislation violate section 25 of article 
IV prohibiting the legislature from passing any local or spe-
cial law authorizing the creation, extension or impairment 
of liens, for the classification of the indigent aged as a group 
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is based upon a clear distinction between them and other indi-
viduals in the state, and applies equally to all persons em-
braced in this class. (See People v. Oentral Pacific R. R. 00., 
105 Cal. 576 [38 Pac. 905] ; Oity oj' Pasadena v. Stimson; 91 
Cal. 238 [27 Pac. 604] ; Darcy v. Oity of San Jose, 104 Cal. 
642 [38 Pac. 500] ; Ohitwood v. Heeke, 219 Cal. 175 [25·Pac. 
(2d) 406].) 
[12] Finally, there can be no constitutional objection to 
the county's release of its lien upon payment to the county 
of such amount as in the opinion of the board of supervisors 
equals the net amount which would be realized in the event 
the lien were foreclosed, since the county would receive the 
fair value of the lien as consideration for its release. It must 
be presumed that in carrying out this section a board of 
supervisors would not abuse the power conferred upon it of 
ascertaining value. (Heeke v. Riley, supra.) 
As none of the objections raised by respondent's demurrer 
is valid, it is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate 
issue as. prayed. 
Shenk, J., Gibson, C. J., York, J., pro tem., Moore, J., 
pro tem., and Carter, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17471. In Bank.-October Il, 1940.] 
JOHN B. BECH'fOLD et al., Respondents, v. BISHOP & 
COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), et al., Appellants. 
HARRY T. McKINLEY et al., Respondents, v. BISHOP & 
COMPANY, INC. ( a Corporation), et al., Appellants. 
[1] EVIDENOE-,-WITNESSES-CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT--DETERMINATION 
of.-In this state the credibility of a witness and the weight to 
be accorded to his testimony are questions duected to the trial 
judge, who under proper circumstances may accept all or such 
part of the testimony of any witness as he believes to be true, 
or may reject all .or any part which he believes to be untrue. 
[2] . NEGLIGENOE-PERSONAL INJURIES-AUTOMOBILES-EVIDENOE-,-WILo 
FUL MISOONDuoT.-In actions for damages for pel'sonal injuries 
resulting from an automobile collision, although it is evident :fro~ 
the finding .of, wilful misconduct that the trial court disbelieved 
